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WHAT MANEUVERS ARE TEACHING US ABOUT 
MILITARY HIGHWAYS
John W. Wheeler,
Colonel, 113th Engineers, Camp Shelby, Mississippi
Speaking frankly and “with the bark off,” maneuvers are 
teaching us that we still lack a great deal of knowledge of how 
to operate motorized and mechanized combat units. It might 
be supposed, because the automobile has been developed in the 
United States and because we have more motor vehicles per 
capita than any other nation in the world, that we would excel 
the other countries in the operation of our motorized combat 
units. But this does not follow any more than that, although 
we pioneered the airplane, other nations have taken air 
superiority from us. We are still likely to think that a motor 
vehicle is a unit of transportation when, in reality, it is but a 
part of a unit of transportation: the highway on which to run 
it is the other part. Neither part is of great value in itself; 
only when properly balanced in relationship to each other do 
we have an efficient unit of transportation. Before going into 
the experiences encountered in the Louisiana maneuvers in 
August and September, 1941, let us discuss the general 
situation that brings about this study and the necessity of 
perfecting the motorized combat unit.
Military highways must be thought of as a means of waging 
offensive war, or as a defensive means. Until a short time ago, 
I believe, every American would have said, “We will never wage 
offensive war—defensive measures are all that we are inter­
ested in”. The writer feels that there is little use of looking 
at defensive measures. In modern warfare, he who waits for 
the offender to come to his borders is lost. Our old neighbor, 
Knute Rockne, said, “Build up a good offense and the defense 
will take care of itself”. Nothing could be more correct or 
better phrased to describe the military situation today.
The present war, both in Europe and in the Orient, is nothing 
but a contest of internal-combustion engines. On land, on sea, 
and in the air—merely an internal-combustion engine war. 
Let's stop for a minute and look at this little fellow who arrived 
with us at the turn of the century. I was a boy when he 
arrived in occasional usage. He was an innocent-looking cub, 
with his old make-and-break spark and intermittent and 
irregular explosion. The first one I remember furnished power 
for a grinder in a feed store. Since then, this placid-looking 
youngster has really and literally gone to town. We have paid 
for this servant of man all he is worth and perhaps more than 
he is worth; but we have him with us for keeps, like it or not. 
In peace-time in America alone, in one installation alone, the 
automobile, this servant of man, kills 40,000 people per year, 
injures many times that number, causes property damage in
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figures the size of which bespeak the more abundant life. 
Figuring a life at $10,000 plus injuries, time lost, doctor bills, 
hospital bills, property damage and all, the automobile has cost 
us more each year in America than our public-school system.
We have in a measure perfected the airplane for pleasure and 
commercial travel and for delivery of the mail and other 
commodities. We have paid for the peacetime development 
of the airplane with the lives of such men as Will Rogers and 
Knute Rockne. We have perfected the farm tractor to the 
extent that it has nearly replaced animal power on the farm, 
as the truck has already done on the city streets.
Now war has come and very nearly blankets the earth, and 
it is nothing more than a war of internal-combustion engines 
—a war under the Selden patent, if you please.
The Road Engineer in Warfare
All this discussion of the gasoline engine leads up to the 
part that road builders and road officials play, and will play, 
in this type of warfare. Mobility of fire power now determines 
the victor of any battle. Mobility is determined by the vehicle 
and the roadway. You will remember that Hitler did not start 
fighting until he had finished his military roads, the “Auto- 
bohnen”. While this nation has by far the greatest system of 
highways of any nation in the world, it must be remembered 
that, until recent years, no thought was given to military value 
in road location and construction. In general our interior 
roads, which were built without military thought, would be, 
and are, of great military value as roads incident to production 
of munitions and supplies. The roads adjacent to our borders 
are not so well suited, because these areas are not our heavily- 
populated areas and hence have few high-type roads. Some 
carefully-planned military highways are needed near our 
borders.
Military Road Requirements
Now let us consider what the 1941 maneuvers taught us with 
respect to highways. You men are not interested directly in 
the tactical road at the front, such as my regiment builds and 
maintains—and, by the way, a combat regiment with an 
infantry division is not expected to build any very good roads. 
Nor are you interested in those built by corps engineers or 
army engineers, but rather in the roads in the so-called theatre 
of operations.
My first recommendation and the one I am most emphatic 
in is wide shoulders. No matter how wide you make the road 
surface or pavement, make the shoulders 12 feet wide. No 
matter how light or poor the surfacing material is, make the 
shoulder 12 feet wide. Who knows what roads may become 
military highways? Let us make all shoulders 12 feet wide
on all roads except where topography is so rugged that it is 
out of the question economically. Under general or ordinary 
conditions, it costs but little more at the time of construction 
to build 12-foot shoulders. Of all integral parts that comprise 
road building, earth grading is the cheapest. The cost of it 
has decreased each year while the cost of other parts has 
increased. Earth that used to be bid in at $.50 per yard now 
is bid in at $.20; and so on accordingly. Such wide shoulders 
would give two extra lanes of traffic in emergencies. It would 
allow slow-moving traffic, such as refugees, to move on the 
shoulders while tactical vehicles used the roadway. It would 
allow our slow-moving transportation, which may have to be 
animal drawn, to use the shoulders, while the fast-moving 
combat elements could use the roadway. You will quickly 
challenge me and say, “What about the bridges—each bridge 
will become a bottleneck ?” My answer to that is that military 
bridges will have to be moved into the road in question at the 
time of its use. Perhaps certain preparations for military 
bridges at the sides of the regular bridge could be made before 
military operations, such as the driving of treated-timber-pile 
abutments, so that the shoulders could be finished right up to 
the water’s edge. You are again going to challenge me by 
saying that what I am proposing is out of the question from 
the standpoint of money, but I will answer that by calling to 
your memory that only five or six years ago our own Mr. Henry 
Ford said there would be no war in Europe for years to come 
because they could not afford it.
After speaking about wide shoulders and preparations for 
additional bridges, I next want to mention provisions being 
made to take vehicles off the road rapidly wherever there is 
cover such as trees, with a well-worked-out plan for putting 
them under cover of the forest and getting them back on the 
road. This can be done at very little expense by merely 
building what we know as farm entrances opposite areas that 
afford cover to military columns. These plans of course would 
have to be worked out with the landowners; yet while it might 
have been difficult to accomplish this a few years ago, we are 
all becoming realists rapidly and would rather have friendly 
troops maneuvering on our land than enemy troops holding it 
permanently.
Now for a short discussion on the offensive road. It is not 
my province in any way to set our military policy as to our 
aggressiveness; but assuming that we would rather be aggres­
sive than vanquished, I will say that in many strategic 
locations in this country systems of offensive military highways 
should be considered. It will be needless to go into details of 
where these should be or of a definite plan of constructing 
them, and it will suffice to say that our highway system in the 
vicinity of our coast lines and borders should be adjusted so 
that we can move out rapidly and meet the enemy before he
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arrives in our territory; so that our own nation with its great 
system of production can remain unhampered to support its 
army. During the war between the States, a southern cavalry 
leader made a great reputation. When questioned as to how 
he brought about his successful military operations, General 
Bedford Forrest said, “I aim to get there with the mostest men 
fustest”. That was approximately 80 years ago, and the 
success of the Nazi Army in all of its campaigns until it struck 
Russia was merely following the plan of Bedford Forrest. If 
we are to keep the enemy from invading our territory, we must 
be able to move our fire power quickly to any point that he may 
choose as his entrance into our nation.
It will not be pleasant to have to add the military factor to 
the highway-construction equation in the future, as it will cost 
considerable money and in some cases will not work to the 
advantage of the civilian and peacetime population. However, 
I am certain that we are all ready to make these sacrifices 
rather than take orders from such enemies as we have today; 
and while the public roads administration and the highway 
departments have in the past few years been giving some 
attention to military highways, I am confident that more 
attention, more study and more money if you please, will have 
to be expended in the future.
Maneuver Experiences
Now let us examine a portion of the 1941 maneuvers that 
leads the writer to believe that the factors set out in this paper 
are sound and constructive.
The maneuvers were held in the southwest quarter of 
Louisiana and in a narrow strip of southeastern Texas just 
west of the Sabine River. This area between the Red and 
Sabine Rivers forms, to some extent, a triangle that narrows 
rapidly on the north as these two rivers get closer together, 
as near Shreveport.
The country is in general a cut-over area grown up to scrub 
oak and with young pine in some tracts on their way back to 
commercial timber again, and a small amount of virgin pine, 
which is now being cut because of higher prices.
The country is low. Lake Charles, Louisiana, which was the 
Headquarters of the Third Army for a long time, is 9 feet 
above sea level, and as you go north the rise is slight, terminat­
ing at Shreveport with an elevation of 225 feet.
Between the Red and the Sabine, the principal water course 
is the Calcasieu River, which runs southeast across the area. 
This is not a formidable stream in itself, but its bottom-ground 
country for a mile or more on each side is nearly an impassable 
wilderness and in some cases clearly impassable for even foot 
troops and their weapons. Infantry has to do some cutting to 
advance.
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Highways in this area are very few, with even fewer 
highways that can be counted on for motor-vehicle movement. 
U. S. 190 runs along the south border of this area from Kinder 
to DeQuincy and is a modern concrete pavement with 5-foot 
shoulders generally, and in a few instances 15-foot shoulders 
where clitch banks are used for the highway and there is an 
excess of fill to start with. U. S. 165 runs north from Kinder 
to Alexandria and is a good concrete highway. From Alexan­
dria to Shreveport State Highway 20 is the best route; it is a 
good secondary road of bituminous material with some concrete 
sections in it. On the west side U. S. 171 runs from Lake 
Charles to Shreveport and is a modern highway of both 
concrete and bituminous construction. The highways I have 
just described actually bound the area used in the maneuver 
of the II vs. the III Army. While these roads were heavily 
used, the interior roads of much inferior type were used 
primarily as the tactical roads over which troops were moved 
and over which supplies had to come forward.
About 380,000 men and 32,000 vehicles were involved in 
this maneuver. We again had it brought home to us that a 
motor vehicle is not a unit of transportation but a part of a unit 
and that the road is the other part. No matter how many 
trucks the army commander, or the corps commander or the 
division commander, has, unless he has roads to run them on 
they are of little avail: not only to run them on but to stop them 
under cover off the main road; to turn great numbers of 
vehicles around in the dark and return for more troops; roads 
that can be depended on in all kinds of weather. Nazi 
experience in Russia right now shows what can be accomplished 
with a highly-mechanized and victorious army trying to operate 
in a terrain with no roads and in terrifically low temperatures. 
The greatest army that ever rolled has failed in the last few 
weeks and is now being harassed from behind by the Cossack 
who, with his horse and lance, was supposed to have been 
relegated to the dump years ago. But because there is no 
highway for this Nazi vehicle to run ,on, the Cossack comes 
back and plays his old role successfully.
The actual experiences of the Louisiana maneuvers with 
highway movements are very interesting. Descriptions of 
them could go on for hours because the writer was charged 
with the road problems of his Division, but time will permit 
of but one or two instances. As you doubtless know, it is the 
function of the division engineer regiment to get our own 
infantry and supporting units forward when we are on the 
offensive, and to block the path of the enemy when we are on 
the defensive. Therefore, it became my duty to furnish road 
reconnaisance to the division commander, showing him the 
routings on which he could advance his motorized combat units. 
In many instances the best road that I could recommend for 
his units making the main effort was a dirt road through the
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woods, over which 6 or 8 miles an hour was the best that could 
be done. In this particular terrain, divisions marching on foot 
could accomplish about as much. In one specific instance, when 
the 38th Division was on the left flank of the Fourth Army 
Corps and expected to keep abreast of the Eighth Army Corps, 
the only highway that we had available over which to make 
our main effort was the right shoulder on U. S. 171 through 
Leesville, Louisiana. The Eighth Army Corps, which wanted 
our assistance badly, finally agreed that we could have the 
right shoulder to move up on, they keeping the concrete slab. 
The entire 76th Brigade was moved through the town of 
Leesville on the 7 foot shoulder of U. S. 171. Time after time, 
because of the low marshy country we were in, these highways 
were jammed by tactical vehicles because there were no 
facilities to get the vehicles off the road and under cover, and 
our vehicles became the vulnerable target of enemy aircraft.
You would be interested I know, as highway men, to ride 
with a convoy of motor vehicles moving under orders and 
notice the paradox that manifests itself. Motor convoys are 
moved in what are called serials. A serial will consist of about 
30 vehicles, and these vehicles will be allowed to run with about 
100 yards between vehicles; the leading vehicle will be told, 
for instance, to set a pace of 25 miles per hour. In five minutes 
after this serial is on the road, the leading vehicle will be 
maintaining its 25 miles per hour and the rear vehicle will be 
making 40 miles an hour to keep his distance. Many factors 
bring this peculiar situation into being. For instance, the 
leading vehicle will be slowed down in a village, and upon 
emerging from the village will immediately go back to its 25 
miles per hour. In the meantime it has slowed down those 
behind it while it was going through the village, and they are 
slowed down again considerably while the leading vehicle has 
again gone back to its 25 miles per hour. In fact, the column 
soon becomes like an accordion, expanding and contracting as 
the speed of the leading vehicle is, by necessity, altered. As 
highway men, you might expect motor columns to move 
through Indiana at 50 and 60 miles per hour, when the fact 
remains that 25 and 30 will be all that can be accomplished.
Since 1910 or thereabouts a great record has been made in 
highway building in the United States. Many of us have seen 
and taken a part in the entire performance up to this point. 
We are proud of the system we have built: proud that it has 
been built for the use of a free people in the pursuit of 
commerce and pleasure. It now appears that even though we 
are still the same peace-loving people, the military values of 
every future highway will have to be considered and sacrifices 
made accordingly. If it has come to that, the road builders 
of this nation accept the challenge and stand with the whistle 
cord in their hands and say, “Let's go".
